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Analysis of Employee Incentive Mechanism in State-owned Enterprise Reform and Mixed-ownership Reform: A Case Study of W Corporation

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DOI: 10.23977/jhrd.2024.060211 | Downloads: 140 | Views: 273

Author(s)

Xiaoyu Li 1, Qianlong Yu 1, Wenqing Li 1

Affiliation(s)

1 Business School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai, 200093, China

Corresponding Author

Xiaoyu Li

ABSTRACT

Against the backdrop of the new era, the socio-economic environment has become increasingly complex and volatile. To ensure sustainable development in a fiercely competitive environment, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) must optimize and innovate their operational systems. Among these efforts, mixed ownership reform (MOR) has demonstrated remarkable effectiveness in optimizing and innovating SOEs. MOR assists SOEs in scientifically reforming their development and operations through capital means, optimizing and innovating their management systems and development models, and exploring new paths for their development through diversified employee incentive methods. Government departments have issued relevant regulations and requirements for MOR in SOEs, calling for the exploration of the optimal path for the organic integration of capital and labor, and the establishment of a scientific and effective employee incentive system. This is aimed at promoting the stable development of SOEs in the new era and achieving the ultimate goal of their reform. Based on this, this article takes W Corporation as an example to analyze the employee incentive path for MOR in SOEs, aiming to provide some reference for SOEs to carry out MOR work.

KEYWORDS

Mixed Ownership Reform in SOEs; Employee Incentives; W Corporation; Performance Management

CITE THIS PAPER

Xiaoyu Lia, Qianlong Yu, Wenqing Li, Analysis of Employee Incentive Mechanism in State-owned Enterprise Reform and Mixed-ownership Reform: A Case Study of W Corporation. Journal of Human Resource Development (2024) Vol. 6: 79-87. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.23977/jhrd.2024.060211.

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