Salesperson Compensation Contract Design Based on Multi-agent Principal Agent Model
DOI: 10.23977/agrfem.2018.11002 | Downloads: 19 | Views: 2675
Hongyan Liu 1
1 Economics and Management Department, North China Electric Power University, Baoding City, Hebei Province, China
Corresponding AuthorHongyan Liu
The effective and efficient motivation of the sales personnel affects the sales of a firm directly. This paper studies the incentive effects of different compensation contracts under the framework of multi-agent principal agent model, and finds that the optimal contract is not the one that ties one salesperson’s compensation to his own performance, but the one that ties his compensation to all the salespersons’ performance. Factors that influence the incentive degree are also discussed.
KEYWORDSCompensation incentive, Multi-agent principal agent model, Sales system
CITE THIS PAPER
Hongyan, L., Salesperson Compensation Contract Design Based on Multi-agent Principal Agent Model. Agricultural & Forestry Economics and Management (2018) 1: 7-13.
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