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Behavioral Logic of Ussr and Usa in the Cuban Missile Crisis: Idea and Interest Perspectives

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DOI: 10.23977/jsoce.2022.040117 | Downloads: 15 | Views: 850

Author(s)

Liu Yuxi 1

Affiliation(s)

1 School of International Relations and Diplomacy, Beijing Foreign Studies University, Beijing, 100089, China

Corresponding Author

Liu Yuxi

ABSTRACT

This article reviews and explains the behavioral logic of the Soviet Union and the United States in the Cuban Missile Crisis from the perspectives of thoughts and profits. Through the study of the administrative idea and interest pursuit of the two countries, the author further discusses the behavior logic of USSR and USA in the final step of the crisis, which is ending the game with shaking hands. Combined with the analysis on structural dynamics of the chicken game, the article concludes that the confrontation between great powers is irrational and risky. A "chicken game" would force both sides to constantly hover on the edge of danger, and the consequences of exerting extreme pressure are unpredictable, making not only the other side, but also oneself, or even the whole world unsafe. In the era of globalization, countries, especially major countries, should actively promote the establishment of more positive international relations. While dealing with international conflicts, all countries should learn to remain calm and view international relations from a long-term strategic perspective, keeping the disagreements among different countries under control.

KEYWORDS

The soviet union, The united states, Behavioral logic, Cuban missile crisis, Idea, Interest

CITE THIS PAPER

Liu Yuxi, Behavioral Logic of Ussr and Usa in the Cuban Missile Crisis: Idea and Interest Perspectives. Journal of Sociology and Ethnology (2022) Vol. 4: 81-85. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.23977/jsoce.2022.040117.

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