The Influence of Ownership Structure of State-owned Companies on Efficiency Investment
Download as PDF
DOI: 10.23977/ICEMGD2020.086
Author(s)
Dan Liu, Yufang Ding and Fengxin Zhu
Corresponding Author
Yufang Ding
ABSTRACT
This paper selects panel data of Shenzhen and Shanghai A-share state-owned listed companies from 2013 to 2018 and discusses the impact of ownership structure on investment efficiency based on principal-agent theory. Through multiple regression analysis, the following conclusions are obtained: State-owned listed companies generally have inefficient investment and under-investment is more common than over-investment. Analysis of the relationship between equity structure and investment efficiency reveals that increasing equity balance and the proportion of institutional investors can help improve the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises.
KEYWORDS
Ownership structure, investment efficiency, state-owned enterprises