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Non-Controlling Majority Shareholder Exit Threat and Corporate Governance—Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

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DOI: 10.23977/acccm.2023.050908 | Downloads: 4 | Views: 295

Author(s)

Luyao Wang 1, Beibei Jiang 2

Affiliation(s)

1 School of Economics and Management, Beijing Jiaotong University, Weihai, 100044, China
2 Ginling College, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing, 210023, China

Corresponding Author

Luyao Wang

ABSTRACT

The threat of exit of non-controlling majority shareholders, as an effective form of equity governance, is playing an increasingly significant role in corporate governance. This paper empirically investigates the implications of the exit threat of non-controlling major shareholders towards corporate governance using a sample of 31,228 observations of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2011 to 2021. The results suggest that the threat of exit from non-controlling majority shareholders contributes to the level of corporate governance. After further endogeneity analysis and robustness tests, the results reveal that the above findings still hold, validating the robustness of the empirical results. This paper reveals the corporate governance effects exerted by the exit threat mechanism of non-controlling majority shareholders, with vital insights for regulators, investors and corporate governance of companies.

KEYWORDS

Exit Threat, Non-controlling Majority Shareholder, Corporate Governance

CITE THIS PAPER

Luyao Wang, Beibei Jiang, Non-Controlling Majority Shareholder Exit Threat and Corporate Governance—Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies. Accounting and Corporate Management (2023) Vol. 5: 61-69. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.23977/acccm.2023.050908.

REFERENCES

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