Author(s)

Dongxiao Wu ¹

Affiliation(s)

¹ Management School, Beijing Union University, Beijing, China

Corresponding Author

Dongxiao Wu

ABSTRACT

This study delves into the relationship between descriptive innovation and managerial opportunistic equity reduction in Beijing's high-tech enterprises through empirical research. The findings reveal a significant positive correlation between descriptive innovation and managerial opportunistic equity reduction. Due to the volatile nature of stock prices in high-tech enterprises, executives tend to opportunistically reduce their equity holdings following successful innovations. This discovery holds immense importance for internal governance and safeguarding shareholder interests in the high-tech sector. These insights provide valuable guidance for corporate management and regulatory decision-making, while also serving as a valuable reference for investors, scholars, and industry practitioners. Overall, this research contributes to the advancement of high-tech enterprises and promotes fairness in the market.

KEYWORDS

Managerial opportunistic equity reduction, descriptive innovation, high-tech enterprises, Beijing

CITE THIS PAPER

Dongxiao Wu, Descriptive Innovation and Managerial Opportunistic Equity Reduction: An Empirical Study of High-Tech Enterprises in Beijing. Accounting and Corporate Management (2023) Vol. 5: 55-62. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.23977/acccm.2023.050809.

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