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Research on the dissent behavior of independent directors education background

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DOI: 10.23977/acccm.2023.050705 | Downloads: 21 | Views: 410

Author(s)

Haiming Wen 1

Affiliation(s)

1 School of Economics, Guangxi University, Nanning, China

Corresponding Author

Haiming Wen

ABSTRACT

This paper studies the influence of academic reputation of independent directors of listed companies in China on their dissent. Based on the samples of listed companies in China from 2007 to 2021, this paper studies the influence of independent directors' academic reputation on raising objections from the perspective of highly educated and independent directors of economics and management. It is found that after controlling other factors, the higher the educational background of independent directors, the higher the probability and quantity of dissent behavior. The mechanism analysis of potential incentive effect and pressure effect was made. The results of this paper show that independent directors with high academic qualifications can actively play their governance functions and raise objections. This paper provides a new perspective for the research on the reputation of independent directors, that is, the academic reputation of independent directors will prompt them to raise objections, promote the good operation of the company and protect the interests of minority shareholders, which is an effective supplement to the current research on the reputation of independent directors in China.

KEYWORDS

Corporate governance, independent director's reputation, independent director's education, dissident behavior

CITE THIS PAPER

Haiming Wen, Research on the dissent behavior of independent directors education background . Accounting and Corporate Management (2023) Vol. 5: 41-49. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.23977/acccm.2023.050705.

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