Author(s)

Xiaoxue Zhang ¹, Shizheng Li ²

Affiliation(s)

¹ School of Management of Science and Engineering, Anhui University of Finance and Economics, Bengbu, China
² School of Finance, Anhui University of Finance and Economics, Caosan Road, Bengbu, China

Corresponding Author

Shizheng Li

ABSTRACT

This paper established a dynamic game model and a reputation model to analyze how to make environmental regulation efficiency considering that regulators behaviors have great impacts on the efficiency of environmental protection in China. We found that the supervisory strength of environmental regulators' authority, cost of regulators' duties, expected future income and degree of punishment for poor performance in work all have important effects on environmental regulators' decision-making, in turn impacting the effectiveness of regulation. Based on this, we suggest that China needs to reform regulation mechanisms to meet the requirements of participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint to reduce the cost of the environmental law enforcement. We also believe that data centers that capable of unearthing regulatory violations should be constructed and the MEE's function should be transformed into an independent technocratic organization to promote diversification of regulatory bodies as soon as possible.

KEYWORDS

Environmental Regulation, Reputation Model, Dynamic Game Theory

CITE THIS PAPER

Xiaoxue Zhang, Shizheng Li, Chinese Environmental Regulatory Body Reform: A Study Based on the Dynamic Game Theory and the Reputation Model. Social Security and Administration Management (2022) Vol. 3: 53-62. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.23977/socsam.2022.030110.

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