Education, Science, Technology, Innovation and Life
Open Access
Sign In

Research on the reverse selection effect of basic medical insurance for flexibly employed people—from the perspective of health risk cognitive bias

Download as PDF

DOI: 10.23977/socsam.2024.050211 | Downloads: 1 | Views: 53

Author(s)

Gu Hualei 1, Feng Guanggang 2

Affiliation(s)

1 School of Finance and Public Administration, Anhui University of Finance and Economics, Bengbu, China
2 School of Finance and Public Administration, Bengbu, China

Corresponding Author

Gu Hualei

ABSTRACT

With the rapid development of the Internet economy, flexible workers play an increasingly important role in the labor market. However, the low participation rate of flexible employees not only restricts the improvement of fairness and sustainability of medical insurance system, but also hinders the healthy development of this group and new business and new economy, which has become a social problem worthy of attention. Based on this, this study analyzes the health insurance choice behavior of flexible employees from the perspective of cognitive bias by using probit model and using the data of china household follow-up survey in 2020. The study found that the more blindly optimistic individuals are more reluctant to buy health insurance; conversely, the more pessimistic individuals are more willing to buy health insurance. 

KEYWORDS

Medical insurance, reverse selection, health risk cognitive bias

CITE THIS PAPER

Gu Hualei, Feng Guanggang, Research on the reverse selection effect of basic medical insurance for flexibly employed people—from the perspective of health risk cognitive bias. Social Security and Administration Management (2024) Vol. 5: 79-87. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.23977/socsam.2024.050211.

REFERENCES

[1] Ma Chao, Qu Zhaopeng, Song Ze. Unequal access to health care for floating population under the background of urban and rural medical insurance co-ordination: The paradox of the principle of ex ante compensation and the principle of ex post compensation [J].China Industrial Economics, 2018(02):100-117.
[2] Arrow K J. Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care[J]. The American economic review, 1963(53): 941-973.
[3] Akerlof G A. The market for" lemons": Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism[J]. The quarterly journal of economics, 1970(83):488-500.
[4] Rothschild, M. and J. Stiglitz. "Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: An essay on the economics of imperfect information [J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1976(90): 629-649.
[5] Hemenway, D. Propitious selection [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1990, 105(4): 1063-1069.
[6] Netzer, N., & Scheuer, F. Competitive Screening in Insurance Markets with Endogenous Wealth Heterogeneity [J]. Economic Theory, 2010, 44(2): 187-211.
[7] Johar, M., & Savage, E. Sources of Advantageous Selection Evidence Using Actual Health Expenditure Risk [J]. Economics Letters, 2012, 116(3): 579-582.
[8] Cardon, J., and I.Hendel. Asymmetric Informationin Health Insurance: Evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey [J].Rand Journal of Economics, 2001, 32(3), 408-427.
[9] Fang, H., & Wu, Z. Multidimensional Private Information, Market Structure, and Insurance Markets [J]. RAND Journal of Economics, 2018, 49(3): 751-787.
[10] Manning, W. G. (1989). "The logged dependent variable, heteroscedasticity, and the retransformation problem." Journal of Health Economics, 8(4), 435-446.
[11] Zhang Huan. Theoretical analysis and empirical research on the problem of adverse selection of social insurance in China [J].Management World, 2006,(02):41-49.
[12] Zhou Lei, Jiang Bo, Wang Jingxi. Research on Adverse Selection in New Rural Social Pension Insurance [J].Insurance Research, 2015, (02):105-116.
[13] Zhu Xinkai, Peng Tingjun. The problem of "adverse selection" in the new rural cooperative medical care: theoretical research and empirical analysis[J].Management World, 2009,(01):79-88.
[14] Xie Yuzhao, Gu Xin. Adverse selection behavior and influencing factors of middle-aged and elderly people in social medical insurance [J].Insurance Research, 2018, (07):71-88.
[15] Zhong Xiaomin, Yang Liumei, Lu Jiankun. The test of adverse selection effect in medical insurance for urban and rural residents [J].Finance & Trade Economics, 2018, 39(10):118-130.
[16] Luo Weixiang. Research on the uninsured status and influencing factors of Chinese adult medical insurance [J].Social Security Review, 2019, 3(01):102-118.
[17] He Wen, Shen Shuguang. Participation and Beneficiary Attribution of Medical Insurance for Flexible Employees: A Double Test Based on Adverse Selection and Positive Distribution Effect [J].Finance & Trade Economics, 2020, 41(03):36-48.

Downloads: 3272
Visits: 83833

All published work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Copyright © 2016 - 2031 Clausius Scientific Press Inc. All Rights Reserved.