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Dual-Class Structure and Firm Value: A New Solution Based on Stewardship Theory

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DOI: 10.23977/acccm.2024.060207 | Downloads: 3 | Views: 73

Author(s)

Miao He 1

Affiliation(s)

1 School of Management, Sichuan Agricultural University, Chengdu, China

Corresponding Author

Miao He

ABSTRACT

Based on the Chinese application of stewardship theory, this paper takes US-listed Chinese stock companies during 2005-2021 as an example, and conducts a qualitative and quantitative study on the nature of dual shareholding and the degree of shareholding separation, respectively, to answer the question of how to design the dual shareholding structure in order to enhance the value of enterprises. It is found that the nature of dual shareholding structure significantly contributes to the value enhancement of Chinese companies in general, but the impact of the degree of shareholding separation on the value of enterprises shows a threshold effect. Specifically, it is manifested as follows: below the threshold and when the control is low, it tends to trench effect and inhibit enterprise value; above the threshold and when the relative control is maintained, it tends to benefit convergence effect and enhance enterprise value. Therefore, it is necessary to guide enterprises to rationally choose a two-tier shareholding structure. At the same time, enterprises should design an appropriate degree of equity separation based on the qualities of the founding team.

KEYWORDS

Dual-Class Structure, Firm Value, Stewardship Theory, Threshold Effect

CITE THIS PAPER

Miao He, Dual-Class Structure and Firm Value: A New Solution Based on Stewardship Theory. Accounting and Corporate Management (2024) Vol. 6: 51-55. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.23977/acccm.2024.060207.

REFERENCES

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