Institutional Investor Attention, Compensation Incentive and Corporate Performance
DOI: 10.23977/ferm.2021.040210 | Downloads: 16 | Views: 288
Ben Liu 1
1 Shenzhen Tourism College, Jinan University, Shenzhen, China
Corresponding AuthorBen Liu
This paper uses the investor relationship data of “interactive easy” platform of Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the data of listed companies of Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2014 to 2019 to construct the index of institutional investor attention, and empirically examines the influence mechanism of institutional investor attention on enterprise performance. It also examines the mediating channels of institutional investor attention on corporate performance. The results show that: institutional investor attention can significantly improve corporate performance; institutional investor attention can improve corporate performance by enhancing the intensity of executive compensation incentive.
KEYWORDSInstitutional investor attention, Compensation incentive, Mediating effect, Corporate performance
CITE THIS PAPER
Ben Liu. Institutional Investor Attention, Compensation Incentive and Corporate Performance. Financial Engineering and Risk Management (2021) 4: 48-52. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.23977/ferm.2021.040210
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