Education, Science, Technology, Innovation and Life
Open Access
Sign In

Institutional Investor Attention, Compensation Incentive and Corporate Performance

Download as PDF

DOI: 10.23977/ferm.2021.040210 | Downloads: 16 | Views: 288

Author(s)

Ben Liu 1

Affiliation(s)

1 Shenzhen Tourism College, Jinan University, Shenzhen, China

Corresponding Author

Ben Liu

ABSTRACT

This paper uses the investor relationship data of “interactive easy” platform of Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the data of listed companies of Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2014 to 2019 to construct the index of institutional investor attention, and empirically examines the influence mechanism of institutional investor attention on enterprise performance. It also examines the mediating channels of institutional investor attention on corporate performance. The results show that: institutional investor attention can significantly improve corporate performance; institutional investor attention can improve corporate performance by enhancing the intensity of executive compensation incentive.

KEYWORDS

Institutional investor attention, Compensation incentive, Mediating effect, Corporate performance

CITE THIS PAPER

Ben Liu. Institutional Investor Attention, Compensation Incentive and Corporate Performance. Financial Engineering and Risk Management (2021) 4: 48-52. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.23977/ferm.2021.040210

REFERENCES

[1] Cen Wei, Tong Naqiong & Guo Qilin.(2017). Institutional Investor Concern and Corporate Inefficiency Investment - An Empirical Study Based on the Data of Shenzhen Stock Exchange's Interactive Exchange Platform. Securities Market Journal,10,36-44.
[2] Liu Jianqiu & Cai Wenting.(2020). Impact of Investor Field Research on Enterprise Strategy Adjustment. International Business (Journal of University of Foreign Economics and Trade),5,141-156.
[3] Zhang Dixin & Li Zhonghai.(2017). Research on the Impact of Institutional Investors on the Performance of Holding Companies--Based on the Perspective of Institutional Investors Self-protection. Journal of Management Science,5.82-101.
[4] Rose, C. (2007). Can institutional investors fix the corporate governance problem? Some Danish evidence. Journal of Management & Governance, 11(4), 405-428. Shavell, S. (1979). Risk sharing and incentives in the principal and agent relationship. The Bell Journal of Economics, 55-73.
[5] Shavell, S. (1979). Risk sharing and incentives in the principal and agent relationship. The Bell Journal of Economics, 55-73.
[6] Smith, G., & Swan, P. L. (2008). Will the Real Monitors Please Stand Up?: Institutional Investors and CEO Compensation. Institutional Investors and CEO Compensation (February 21, 2008).
[7] Liu Yongli &Wang Kaili. (2018) .A study on executive compensation structure, team stability and corporate performance. monthly journal of Finance and accounting.,16,35-44

Downloads: 801
Visits: 34130

All published work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Copyright © 2016 - 2031 Clausius Scientific Press Inc. All Rights Reserved.