Author(s)

Ke Huang ¹

Affiliation(s)

¹ Business School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai, 200093, China

Corresponding Author

Ke Huang

ABSTRACT

From the perspective of game theory, this paper analyzes the causes of the messy phenomenon of celebrity tax evasion and proposes measures to solve it. This paper constructs the " auditor-celebrity" game model in the general situation, the situation of celebrity giving bribes and the situation of tax department implementing incentives, analyzes the game model matrix, establishes and parses the game function, and concludes that celebrity tax evasion is the result of the game that celebrity tax evasion cost is too low and the cost of auditing is high. Then, it provides practical and effective policy suggestions for the relevant government departments from the implementation of incentives, simplification of tax procedures, and enhancement of penalties to help realize tax fairness and social stability.

KEYWORDS

Celebrity tax evasion, game theory, implementation of incentives, simplification of tax procedures, enhancement of penalties

CITE THIS PAPER

Ke Huang, Analysis of Celebrity Tax Evasion from Game Theory. Social Security and Administration Management (2023) Vol. 4: 122-126. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.23977/socsam.2023.040817.

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