Education, Science, Technology, Innovation and Life
Open Access
Sign In

Judicial governance of FRAND rate determination in standard essential patent disputes——Centering on the coordination of referee methods and procedures

Download as PDF

DOI: 10.23977/law.2026.050213 | Downloads: 2 | Views: 67

Author(s)

Weibo Yuan 1

Affiliation(s)

1 School of Law, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing, 210023, China

Corresponding Author

Weibo Yuan

ABSTRACT

Standard essential patents (SEPs) are deeply embedded in industries such as telecommunications. Determining fair, reasonable, and non‑discriminatory (FRAND) rates has become a key issue in balancing patent protection. This paper examines the judicial governance of FRAND rate determination in SEP disputes, focusing on the underlying interest structure, adjudicative methods, jurisdictional boundaries of global licensing, and the application of anti‑suit injunctions. The study argues that FRAND rate determination should balance the private right nature of patents with the public nature of technical standards while preventing both patent hold‑up and reverse hold‑up. Regarding adjudicative methods, courts should give due consideration to the combined application of the comparable agreement method and the top‑down method, particularly by examining the conditions for applying the comparable agreement method from the perspectives of the parties, scope of license, and patent portfolio. In the context of global licensing, although global rate determination can improve efficiency and reduce repetitive litigation, it should be constrained by factors such as substantial connection, the parties’ negotiation history, and the principle of patent territoriality. This paper aims to provide ideas for Chinese courts to improve their rules on FRAND rate adjudication and to participate prudently in international SEP governance.

KEYWORDS

Standard essential patents; FRAND rate; Comparable agreement method; Judicial governance

CITE THIS PAPER

Weibo Yuan. Judicial governance of FRAND rate determination in standard essential patent disputes——Centering on the coordination of referee methods and procedures. Science of Law Journal (2026). Vol. 5, No. 2, 90-96. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/DOI: 10.23977/law.2026.050213.

REFERENCES

[1] Lemley, M. A., & Shapiro, C. (2007). Patent holdup and royalty stacking. Texas Law Review, 85(7), 1991–2049.
[2] Contreras, J. L. (2015). A brief history of FRAND: Analyzing current debates in standard setting and antitrust through a historical lens. Antitrust Law Journal, 80(1), 39–120.
[3] Zhang, Y. Z. & Wang, Y. L.(2015). An international comparison of standard-essential patent litigation: Types of actions and adjudicative experience. Intellectual Property, 2015(3), 92–99.
[4] Liu, Y. (2022). Calculating FRAND License Fee: Philosophy,Principle,and Method. Tsinghua Law Journal, 16(4), 10–27.
[5] Zhang, Y. R. & Wu, W. F. (2023). An empirical study of the influencing factors to determine the FRAND license royalties for standard-essential patents. Science Research Management, 44(2), 146–155.
[6] Rui, S. Y. (2024). Determination of FRAND Rates in Standard Essential Patent Cases. Tribune of Political Science and Law, (6).
[7] Li, Z. H.(2026). On the Applicable Conditions of "Comparable Agreement Method" in the Determination of Standard Essential Patent Royalty Rates. Journal of International Economic Law, (1).
[8] Zhang, Y. R. & Zhang, X. N. (2019). A Sudy on the Calculation of Royalty of Standard Essential Patents in the Field of ICT——Comparison Based on the Cases of TCL V.Ericsson and Unwired Planet V.Huawei. Forum on Science and Technology in China, 2019(12), 126–134.
[10] Zhao, X. Y. (2025). A Critique of the Justification of Global Rate Jurisdiction for Standard Essential Patents——From the Contractual Perspective of "Unwired Planet v. Huawei". Forum on Science and Technology in China, (6).
[11] Li, Z. X. (2025). Judicial Logic of Resolving Disputes Over Standard Essential Patent Licenses. Peking University Law Journal, (1).
[12] Song, J. L. (2025). Reshaping Predictable Governance of Cross-Border Standard-Essential Patent Disputes through the Uniform Application of International Rules:A Perspective from the WTO DS611 Ruling. Journal of Comparative Law, (6).
[13] Ke, C. L. (2026). Critical analysis of the "WTO: China-Europe-Intellectual Property" case and the institutional optimization of China's standard necessary patent prohibition order .Germany Studies,(1).

All published work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Copyright © 2016 - 2031 Clausius Scientific Press Inc. All Rights Reserved.