Somatic Marker Theory-Based Integrated Model of Bottom-up Psychosomatic Symptom Formation from Body to Symptoms
DOI: 10.23977/aetp.2026.100211 | Downloads: 1 | Views: 60
Author(s)
Lirong Ruan 1
Affiliation(s)
1 International College of Mongolian Academy of Social Sciences, Ulaanbaatar, 11000, Mongolia
Corresponding Author
Lirong RuanABSTRACT
The mechanisms underlying the development of clinical psychosomatic symptoms have long been predominantly studied through a 'top-down' cognitive-emotional pathway. However, a large number of patients presenting with somatic discomfort as their chief complaint, which cannot be explained by organic pathology, exhibit the opposite process: abnormally amplified somatic sensations, lacking effective emotional markers, gradually solidify into persistent psychosomatic symptoms. Building upon a systematic review of somatic marking theory, interoception theory and emotional construction theory, this paper proposes an integrative bottom-up theoretical model that divides the development of psychosomatic symptoms into four stages: perceptual abnormality, marking deficiency, integrative dysfunction and symptom consolidation. Finally, the practical implications of the model are discussed in terms of clinical differentiation, doctor-patient communication and psychotherapeutic strategies.
KEYWORDS
Psychosomatic Symptoms; Somatic Marking Theory; Interoception; Bottom-up Pathway; Theoretical ModelCITE THIS PAPER
Lirong Ruan. Somatic Marker Theory-Based Integrated Model of Bottom-up Psychosomatic Symptom Formation from Body to Symptoms. Advances in Educational Technology and Psychology (2026). Vol. 10, No. 2, 72-78. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.23977/aetp.2026.100211.
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