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Somatic Marker Theory-Based Integrated Model of Bottom-up Psychosomatic Symptom Formation from Body to Symptoms

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DOI: 10.23977/aetp.2026.100211 | Downloads: 1 | Views: 60

Author(s)

Lirong Ruan 1

Affiliation(s)

1 International College of Mongolian Academy of Social Sciences, Ulaanbaatar, 11000, Mongolia

Corresponding Author

Lirong Ruan

ABSTRACT

The mechanisms underlying the development of clinical psychosomatic symptoms have long been predominantly studied through a 'top-down' cognitive-emotional pathway. However, a large number of patients presenting with somatic discomfort as their chief complaint, which cannot be explained by organic pathology, exhibit the opposite process: abnormally amplified somatic sensations, lacking effective emotional markers, gradually solidify into persistent psychosomatic symptoms. Building upon a systematic review of somatic marking theory, interoception theory and emotional construction theory, this paper proposes an integrative bottom-up theoretical model that divides the development of psychosomatic symptoms into four stages: perceptual abnormality, marking deficiency, integrative dysfunction and symptom consolidation. Finally, the practical implications of the model are discussed in terms of clinical differentiation, doctor-patient communication and psychotherapeutic strategies.

KEYWORDS

Psychosomatic Symptoms; Somatic Marking Theory; Interoception; Bottom-up Pathway; Theoretical Model

CITE THIS PAPER

Lirong Ruan. Somatic Marker Theory-Based Integrated Model of Bottom-up Psychosomatic Symptom Formation from Body to Symptoms. Advances in Educational Technology and Psychology (2026). Vol. 10, No. 2, 72-78. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.23977/aetp.2026.100211.

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