

The Ethics of Vaccination: Preserving Liberty and Health

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Abstract: In contexts where public health risks and individual bodily autonomy are juxtaposed, the ethical legitimacy of vaccination policies depends on a comprehensive balance between risk externalities, minimal coercion, and procedural justice. Drawing on the harm principle and a "clean hands" perspective, this article argues that limited, transparent, and reversible mandatory vaccination is conditionally justifiable when infectiousness is high, poses a significant and imminent risk to vulnerable populations, and educational and accessibility interventions are ineffective. Furthermore, historical injustice and uncertainty necessitate a step-by-step policy approach: trust first, constraints later. This approach prioritizes the implementation of demonstrable necessity and proportionality requirements in high-risk settings and specific public settings, supported by adverse event monitoring and no-fault compensation. The article further proposes a policy design checklist: "minimum coercion—revocable reversibility—compensation—and fairness." This checklist aims to protect public health while maintaining institutional trust and individual dignity, providing an actionable ethical framework and evaluation criteria for future immunization governance.

1. Introduction

Few public-health questions cut more deeply into our moral intuitions than vaccination mandates. Bodily autonomy is a core liberal value; to inject a substance without consent seems a paradigmatic violation of self-ownership. Yet modern vaccines avert an estimated 3.5–5 million deaths annually—more than any other clinical intervention—and protect those who cannot protect themselves [1]. When voluntary uptake falters, preventable diseases resurge: in the 2019 U.S. measles scare, most patients were un- or under-vaccinated, and two localized outbreaks nearly cost the nation its measles-free status [2]. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed, in real time, how closely one person's choice can be tied to another's survival. This paper asks whether coercive vaccination policies can be justified and, if so, under what conditions they preserve both liberty and health.

The autonomy claim is formidable. Medical interventions pierce the literal boundary of the self; respecting patients' wishes is thus foundational to biomedical ethics. Kant's injunction to treat persons as ends warns that forced vaccination risks instrumentalizing individuals for herd immunity [3]. Sandel's "veil of ignorance" reframes the fairness test; behind the veil, many would resist non-consensual injection—especially members of groups with histories of medical coercion (e.g., Tuskegee) [4]. Brownlee further shows how consent can erode when institutions reward doing more

rather than doing right, rendering even life-saving technologies ethically fraught when patient agency is sidelined [5]. Community practice echoes this: leaders meeting residents “where they are”—churches, barbershops, food pantries—rebuild trust without compulsion. Autonomy has intrinsic and instrumental value; premature coercion can backfire, deepen hesitancy, and erode legitimacy.

But autonomy is not a blank check to endanger others. Infectious diseases create negative externalities: one person’s refusal imposes non-consensual risks on neighbors, the immunocompromised, and infants [6]. Brennan sharpens this into a “clean-hands” principle: individuals have a duty not to participate in the collective imposition of unjust harm; refusing a safe, low-cost vaccine amid a dangerous outbreak violates that duty [7]. Empirically, standard childhood immunization cut U.S. measles incidence by >99% after 1963; when coverage dipped below $\approx 95\%$ in 2019 pockets, cases rebounded immediately, including hospitalizations among infants too young to vaccinate [8].

Justice frameworks converge on conditional permissibility once good-faith, less-intrusive measures fail. A utilitarian calculus counts net lives saved when interventions are safe, effective, and scalable [1,8]. Policy design must still honor meaningful agency: Emanuel’s universal-coverage model insists on real choice among qualified options, illustrating how population goals can advance without hollowing out decision-making [9]. Rawlsian reasoning suggests that behind the veil many would secure robust vaccination to protect the immunocompromised—or the unlucky infant—they might be [10]. Equity considerations underscore that failure to maintain herd protection disproportionately burdens already vulnerable communities; pandemic experience documented higher risks driven by essential work, multigenerational housing, and medical redlining rather than “poor choices”.

Accordingly, practice should follow a least-coercive-effective-means pathway: begin with trust-building, tailored communication, and universal access; escalate only if serious, imminent harm persists. Partnerships with trusted messengers and mobile services increased uptake without mandates. When soft tools fail—e.g., during high-transmission waves—incremental conditions may be warranted: requirements tied to discretionary, higher-risk settings (health-care employment, university housing) and, where necessary, school-entry rules with medical exemptions and narrowly tailored religious waivers [6–8]. Any movement toward compulsion must be bounded by procedural justice: transparent safety monitoring and public reporting, no-fault injury compensation, equity safeguards (paid sick leave, transportation, proximate no-cost clinics), and clear sunset clauses keyed to epidemiology [5]. The guiding maxim is simple: persuade first, facilitate always, compel last—and only with fairness. Done this way, vaccination policy protects the equal freedom of all not to have their lives cut short by another’s choice.

2. Ethical Foundations of Autonomy

Medical interventions pierce the literal boundary of the self; respecting patients’ wishes is therefore a foundational principle of biomedical ethics. The right is not merely procedural. Immanuel Kant, a German philosopher during the enlightenment period, held that we must treat every person as an end in themselves, never merely as a means; forced vaccination risks instrumentalizing individuals for herd immunity. Michael Sandel’s *Justice* invites readers to test public policies behind a “veil of ignorance” to determine whether they treat people fairly (Sandel). Behind that veil many would recoil at being injected without consent—especially members of groups that have historically suffered medical coercion like the Tuskegee incident where many people of color were used as test experiments for syphilis (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). Real-world cautionary tales reinforce the point. For instance, Shannan Brownlee’s *Overtreated* recounts patients who were harmed or bankrupted by “care that’s useless and potentially harmful,” blameworthy in large part

because informed consent deteriorated whenever profits rose (Brownlee 3). Her point is not that all intervention is bad; rather, when systemic pressures override informed choice, even life-saving technology can become a tool that might not be morally just. Her cautionary tales apply to the vaccine debate: if parents perceive vaccination campaigns as paternalistic or financially motivated, they grow suspicious, even if the science is solid (Brownlee). That approach accords with The Health Disparities Podcast, where community leaders from Detroit to rural Alabama describe meeting residents “where they are” –in churches, barbershops, and food pantries–to answer fears born of history, not ignorance (Movement is Life Caucus, “COVID-19 Pandemic–Let’s Talk About Privilege”). Indeed, History suggests that ignoring questions breeds resistance, while respectful dialogue builds trust. Autonomy has instrumental as well as intrinsic value in human society. Coercion, if launched prematurely, can spur backlash and drive hesitant groups away. Consequently, any ethical framework must give genuine weight to personal choice. That does not end the conversation–people can forfeit certain liberties when they endanger others–but it sets a high bar: coercion demands a special justification and clear showing that softer tools have been tried in good faith and found wanting.

3. Public Health Externalities and the Harm Principle

However, respect for autonomy is not a blank check to endanger neighbors and those around you. Infectious diseases create what economists call negative externalities: one person’s private refusal can inflict a public cost. John Stuart Mill’s harm principle therefore allows society to limit liberty when its exercise threatens other’s basic interests. Indeed, this phenomenon justifies that society should be able to limit liberty when its exercise threatens other’s basic interest. Jason Brennan sharpens this notion in *When All Else Fails*, proposing the “clean-hands principle.” Individuals, he argues, have a duty not to participate in the collective imposition of unjust harm; refusing a safe, low-cost vaccine in the midst of a dangerous outbreak violates that duty by increasing infection risk for others in the community (Brennan 39). Importantly, Brennan writes from a libertarian perspective–otherwise famed for skepticism of state power–demonstrating that even champions of individual rights concede limits when refusal imposes non-consensual risk. Empirically, the case is overwhelming. Standard childhood immunization has driven U.S. measles incidence down more than 99 percent since 1963. Yet when coverage dipped below the 95 percent herd-immunity threshold in certain pockets in 2019, measles returned immediately; 72 percent of patients were children whose parents had declined shots, and several infants too young to vaccinate were hospitalized (Patel).

4. Justice Frameworks and Equity Considerations

Indeed, Ezekiel Emanuel cautions against political overreach in *Healthcare, Guaranteed*. Although he champions universal coverage, he argues that reforms must respect consumer choice: citizens in his voucher-based model may “choose any qualified plan” or physician, preserving meaningful agency while advancing population welfare (Emanuel). Justice theory also converges on the permissibility of mandates once voluntary uptake proves inadequate. A utilitarian counts net lives saved. A Rawlsian notes that citizens behind a veil of ignorance would choose robust vaccination to protect the immunocompromised or the unlucky infant they might turn out to be (Leif). A communitarian insists civic membership comes with reciprocal obligations, like paying taxes or serving on juries. Even Kantian ethics, wary of using persons as means, can justify mandates when refusal itself treats other persons as mere instruments for one’s “freedom.” The Health Disparities Podcast adds a crucial equity dimension: low-income Black, Latino, and rural communities bore disproportionate COVID-19 mortality, not because of “poor choices” but because essential jobs, multigenerational housing, and medical redlining exposed them to higher risk (Movement Is Life Caucus, “Why Equity Must Lead” 12:10-13:45). Failing to achieve herd immunity is therefore not

value-neutral; it predictably burdens the already burdened. Thus, public health ethics tilts toward protective mandates precisely to avoid compounding injustice. The moral logic is simple: my liberty ends where your right to life and health begins, especially when the tool that secures that right is safe, proven, and readily available.

5. Policy Pathway: From Least-Coercive Means to Conditional Mandates (with Safeguards)

If society is sometimes justified in demanding vaccination, the harder task is deciding how to do so without trampling legitimate freedoms. Philosophers call this least-coercive-effective-means principle. Indeed, the COVID-19 pandemic fieldwork shows that trust is the real dose-limiting factor: when clinics partnered with local pastors and acknowledged historical trauma, uptake rose sharply—no mandate required (Batemen). The Health Disparities Podcast offers dozens of parallel stories: a Navajo Nation mobile clinic that paired shots with water-safety kits, a Chicago barbershop campaign where stylists doubled as vaccine educators, a Mississippi church bus repurposed as a rolling vaccination site (Movement Is Life Caucus). These successes demonstrate that access and respect are powerful non-coercive levers.

Still, soft tools sometimes fail—polio in northern Nigeria, measles in parts of Oregon, or COVID-19 at the height of Delta, a later COVID-19 variant. At such points, policymakers should escalate incrementally, starting with first-tier mandates which tie vaccination to discretionary activities (such as university enrollment, or health-care employment). Second-tier mandates would follow making immunization a condition of school attendance, with medical exemptions and, in some states, limited religious waivers. Because the decision affects children's peers as well as the child, the risk-imposition argument is strong. Indeed, even Brennan notes that such mandates are no more illiberal than seatbelt laws: both restrict choice to prevent foreseeable, grave harm to others (Brennan).

Transparency and procedural fairness are crucial. Brownlee warns that public trust erodes rapidly if citizens suspect profit motives or sloppy safety monitoring (Brownlee). Therefore, ethical mandates should publicize robust data on adverse events, offer no-fault compensation for rare injuries, and sunset automatically when epidemiological criteria are met. Sandel would call these measures ways of ensuring that coercion, when unavoidable, is still rooted in fairness and equal concern (Sandel). Thus, equity requires that logistical barriers never substitute for "choices." If paid sick leave, transportation, or internet access are missing, a nominally "voluntary" program is coercive in practice because it loads the cost of compliance onto the least-advantaged. Movement Is Life panelists emphasize that no-cost, walk-in clinics within five miles of vulnerable neighborhoods were the single best predictor of rising COVID-19 coverage (Movement Is Life Caucus). In short, mandates may be morally legitimate, but they are also morally lazy if enacted before society has invested in access, education, and reparative trust-building.

6. Conclusion

The core of vaccine policy lies not in the abstract choice of "compulsion" or "freedom," but in designing a reversible path that achieves the greatest public good with minimal harm within specific risks and populations. This article, anchored by risk externalities and procedural justice, proposes a step-by-step framework: "trust first, accessibility second, restrictions second, and strong safeguards." It incorporates transparent monitoring, no-fault compensation, and sunset clauses as necessary policy conditions to mitigate the trust deficit posed by memories of historical injustice and uncertainty. Future research can advance in three areas: first, building real-time assessment and decision-making support systems that accommodate uncertainty; second, systematically comparing heterogeneous effects across different groups and scenarios; and third, tracking institutional trust as an independent policy objective over the long term. Only by advancing immunization governance within the dual

constraints of norms and evidence can we safeguard public health while upholding individual dignity and social trust.

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