An Empirical Analysis of the Influence of ETR Adjustment on Social General Equilibrium-Based on the Empirical Data of Listed Companies in Various Industries

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Keywords: ETR of Listed C ompany, OLS M odel, C GE M odel, Industry Adjustment, Social General Equilibrium

Abstract: According to the sample data from listed companies of various Industries in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets from 2008 to 2010, this article used the company size, profitability, capital structure and other firm features, and furthermore, introduced an annual, industry, the actual holding and the tax preference policy as dummy variables, did research on the factors affecting E TR. Based on t his, we extracted the industry factor which is significant to the economic, and depended on the computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis, by adjusting the industry ETR to determine the influence of social general equilibrium. The results indicate that, if the direct, indirect taxation under the premise of the s ame pr oportion, t o r educe or t o i mprove indirect t ax r ate of t he r eal e state a nd departments o f i ndustry i s a n effective way t o i mprove C hina's l ong-term e conomic development.

1. Introduction

When examining the enterprise income tax burden, the effective tax rate (ETR) of the company has become a better alternative measurement tool. Its level has a direct impact on the cash flow and after tax profit of the enterprise, and thus determines its survival and development. At the same time, it plays an important role in the national fiscal revenue, e conomic development and social stability. The research on the a ctual tax b urden of enterprises, especially listed companies, h as attracted the attention of tax policy makers and researchers. We find that in recent years, Chinese and f oreign s cholars h ave m ade ce rtain a chievements in the empirical r esearch on the f actors affecting the actual tax burden of listed companies.

Atulan Guha(2007)[1] Based on the panel data from 1992 to 2001, using explanatory variables such as financial leverage, net asset ratio, plant and equipment, and total assets, this paper examines the relationship between the company size and the ETR of private manufacturing industry in India in a multivariate model. The results show that there is a significant negative correlation between company s ize and E TR. A nd ex plain that large companies can reduce the effective tax rate by

taking advantage of certain factors in the domestic administrative system.

Lou Quan(2007)[2] Taking the data of China's listed companies from 1994 to 2004 as a sample, this paper i nvestigates the t ax bur den of 1 isted companies and i ts i nfluencing f actors s ince the implementation of the tax sharing system. The results show that there are regional and industrial differences in the overall tax bur den of 1 isted companies. The overall tax bur den is significantly positively related t o i ncome t ax bur den, t urnover t ax bur den, a sset s cale, pr of itability, capital intensity and annual variables, but negatively related to debt level and investment income.

Cao Shujun, Zhang Wanjun(2008)[3] Based on t he panel data of 4251 isted companies from 1998 to 2004, this paper applies the random effect model to deeply study the company characteristic factors affecting ETR. The results show that there is no significant relationship between the size of listed companies, the density of fixed assets and ETR. Financial leverage has a significant negative correlation with ETR. The over employment of employees will get tax preference from the local government. W hen l isted c ompanies generally e njoy t ax pr efference, pr of itability and e quity structure are significantly positively related to ETR. When the tax policy changes, their impact on ETR is no longer significant.

Wu L iansheng(2009)[4] Taking C hinese l isted c ompanies a s s amples, this paper s tudies t he impact of state-owned e quity on corporate tax burden. The conclusion shows that the higher the proportion of s tate-owned e quity, the higher the c orporate tax burden. The positive tax effect of state-owned equity o f non t ax pr efference c ompanies i s s ignificantly higher t han t hat of t ax preference c ompanies. Zhou J ing(2011)[5] Based on t he panel da ta of C hinese l isted c ompanies from 2007 t o 2008, the r esults s how t hat E TR i s s ignificantly positively correlated with a sset liability ratio, significantly negatively correlated with return on investment and equity structure, but not significantly correlated with company size and capital intensity.

The above scholars mostly discuss the relationship and stability with ETR from the factors such as the s cale of listed companies, e quity structure, c apital s tructure, p rofitability, etc., but r arely involve the nature and proportion of a ctual s hareholders, preferential tax rate of income tax and joint investigation by industry, which provides a thinking space for the research of this paper.

According to modern tax theory, the ideal goal of tax system reform is to achieve an optimal tax system s tructure, s o t hat t he functions of t ax efficiency and f airness c an be t aken i nto a ccount. Efficiency can be directly reflected by economic variables, but equity can not be directly observed. Therefore, some scholars such as Stiglitz (2002) think that "although we cannot define the optimal tax policy, we can simulate the method of changing the tax policy to increase welfare". After that, domestic and foreign scholars have applied various equilibrium models to discuss this issue. For example, X u P u and S u Zhentian (2012) have established an "inter period dynamic" equilibrium model, It simulates the situation of increasing indirect tax while reducing direct tax. The results show t hat t his c an bring about t he growth of social w elfare, t he i mprovement of p roduction efficiency, and the increase of GNP. However, the existing research has shown that reducing the proportion of direct taxes focuses on the realization of social efficiency, while reducing the proportion of i ndirect t axes is more he lpful t o i mprove s ocial e quity. C ompared with m ost developed countries in the world, the proportion of indirect tax in China is relatively high, while the proportion of direct tax is relatively low. And such a tax system structure is increasingly not in line with the n eeds of s ocial d evelopment. B ased on t hese considerations, the tax S cience R esearch Institute of the State Administration of Taxation proposed to increase the proportion of direct tax in tax revenue in 2005. Recently, scholars such as Liu Zuo (2010) have explained the necessity of tax system structure adjustment for the development of China's tax system. Therefore, the tax system adjustment simulated by Xu Pu and Su Zhentian is to reduce social equity and improve economic efficiency. This is not in line with the design idea of the optimal tax system and deviates from the long-term social development goal of giving consideration to fairness and efficiency.

Based on t he a bove c onsiderations, t his paper t akes t he non-financial lis ted c ompanies in Shenzhen and Shanghai from 2008 to 2010 as a sample, uses the company characteristics such as company size, profitability and capital structure, and introduces the year, industry, actual holding and tax preference as dummy variables to empirically analyze the factors affecting E TR. On this basis, on the premise of not changing the proportion of direct tax and indirect tax, only adjust the actual tax burden of indirect tax in different industries to measure its impact on the general balance of society. Such simulation can analyze how the tax system adjustment can make the tax efficiency further w ithout a ffecting the t ax f airness, and m ake contributions to the opt imization of the t ax system in China.

The other parts of this paper are a rranged as follows: the second part is the research design, including sample data sources and research methods. The third part is empirical analysis, including OLS model analysis and CGE model to simulate the impact of inter industry tax burden adjustment on social general equilibrium. The last part is the summary of the whole paper.

2. Data and Method

2.1 Sample Selection and Data Source

In this paper, the relevant data of A-share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai from 2008 to 2 011 are s elected as the r esearch s amples, and the s amples are s creened ac cording t o the following steps: considering the impact of extreme values, the listed companies of ST and Pt in any year are excluded. Exclude any company whose total annual profit be fore interest and tax is less than or equal to zero or whose income tax expense is less than zero. Excluding financial (code I) listed c ompanies. E liminate a s mall n umber of c ompanies w ith ir regular a nd mis sing data information di sclosure. According to the above criteria, we have s elected a total of 437 e ligible listed companies as sample companies (1311 observations in total). All data are from guotai'an data service center and Shenzhen, and have undergone necessary calculation and collation.

2.2 Variables and Study Definitions

2.2.1 Explained Variable: Actual Income Tax Burden (ETR) of the Company

ETR=Income tax expense / total profit before interest and tax.

The numerator r eflects the income tax expenses actually p aid by the enterprise in the current period, and the denominator reflects the total profit before interest and tax of the company. Since there is no economic significance when the value of ETR calculation is greater than 1 or less than 0, the samples with the value range in this range are excluded.

2.2.2 Explanatory Variables

Existing researches on the influencing factors of the company's ETR generally believe that the company's size, profitability and capital structure have a significant impact on the company's actual tax bur den. T his paper s elects t hese variables a s e xplanatory variables in t he r egression m odel, mainly t o analyze t he r elevant factors af fecting t he company's a ctual t ax r ate. T hese i nclude company s ize, a sset lia bility r atio LEV, r eturn on i nvestment R OA, a sset i ntensity c apint a nd inventory intensity invint.

The c ompany s ize is expressed by the natural l ogarithm of the t otal a ssets at the end of the period. There are two different views on the relationship between the size of the company and the effective t ax r ate: o ne v iew h olds t hat l arge companies r eceive m ore p ublic at tention, and t his "political cost" will lead to a higher effective tax rate. Another view is that the effective tax rate of

large companies is lower be cause t hey c an us e more resources for t ax pl anning a nd pol itical lobbying. Its coefficient sign is expected to be positive.

Asset liability ratio (Lev) = total liabilities at the end of the period / total assets at the end of the period. As the interest has the function of tax deduction, the effective tax rate of the company with high asset liability ratio is relatively low. On the contrary, companies with higher effective tax rates tend to borrow debt because the interest of debt has the function of tax deduction. In this way, there may also be a positive correlation between the effective tax rate and financial leverage.

Return on investment (ROA) = net profit / total assets. The return on total assets represents the profitability of the company. From the perspective of tax neutrality, there is no relationship between the t ax r ate a nd pr of tability. H owever, s ome s tudies s how t hat t here i s a s ignificant positive correlation b etween the effective t ax r ate and profitability. In addition, there are as set intensity (capint) = n et fixed a ssets / to tal a ssets and in ventory intensity (invint) = n et in ventory / to tal capital.

2.2.3 Dummy variable

Variable type	Variable name		Variable description
Explained	Actual income		Income tax expense / total profit before interest and tax
variable	tax burden	ETR	
	company size	Size	Natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the period
	Asset liability		Total liabilities at the end of the period / total assets at
	ratio	Lev	the end of the period
Explanatory	Return on	Roa	
variable	investment		Net profit / total assets
variable	Asset		
	concentration	Capint	Net fixed assets / total assets
	Inventory		
	density	Invint	Net inventory / total capita
	year	Year	Annual dummy variable, used to control the annual
	yeur		macroeconomic impact
	industry	Industry	Industry virtual variable, used to control industry
	maastry		differences
Dummy		Control_R	Proportion of the actual controller holding the control
variable	Controlling	ate	of the listed company
		Control	The nature of the actual controller, distinguishing
			between state-owned holding and non-state-owned
			holding
	Tax preference Tax_F		Tax preference virtual variable, used to control the
	r mr protoronoo		impact of preferential tax rate

Table 1: Definition and description of main variables

Considering that the above company characteristic factors are not all factors affecting ETR, on the basis of the research results of domestic and foreign scholars, we introduce macro factors that can affect ETR as virtual variables to consider. One is annual variable. Since the new enterprise income tax has been implemented since 2008, in order to compare the difference caused by the change of tax rate, year is used to represent the virtual variable of the year where the company's data is located, where year 1 = 1 represents 2008, year 1 = 0 and year 2 = 0 r epresents 2009, and year 2 = 1 r epresents 2010. S econd, industry variables. It is found that the actual tax bur den of different i ndustries varies g reatly according to the formulation of national tax policies and the

nature o f in dustries. W e d ivide th e sample d ata in to s ix c ategories, n amely, real e state in dustry (FDC), commerce (SY), e nergy i ndustry (NY), industry (except e nergy i ndustry) (GY), s ervice industry (FW) and comprehensive. In this paper, industry is taken as the control group (FDC = 0, FW = 0, Zh = 0, NY = 0, SH = 0), When FDC = 1, it represents real estate industry. When shy = 1, it represents commerce. When NY = 1, it represents energy industry. When FW = 1, it represents service industry. When shy = 0, it represents commerce. The third is the holding situation. In order to distinguish between state-owned holding and non-state holding, the dummy variable control is introduced. When control = 1 is state-owned holding, control = 0 is non-state holding. The fourth is the tax preference. In order to distinguish whether to enjoy the tax preference policy, the virtual variable tax is introduced_Rate, where tax_Rate = 1 indicates that the company enjoys preferential tax policies, tax_Rate = 0 indicates that the company does not enjoy preferential tax policies. The variables and descriptions are shown in Table 1

2.3 Research Ideas and Methods

2.3.1 The Research Idea

Firstly, by analyzing the research results at home and abroad, it is determined that the annual, industry, holding, tax preference and other virtual variables will be comprehensively investigated with other company characteristics such as company size, profitability and capital structure. After descriptive statistics, OLS model will be used for regression to analyze the impact on the ETR of listed companies. On this basis, the industry attributes with important e conomic significance are selected as the key points for cross examination with the holding situation and whether the company enjoys tax preference, and the meaning of special economic policies in ETR is analyzed. Finally, based on the analysis of computable general equilibrium (CGE), without changing the proportion of direct tax and indirect tax, the impact on social general equilibrium is measured by adjusting only the actual tax burden of indirect tax in different industries.

2.3.2 Research Method

Carry out descriptive statistics on the observed sample data and analyze the distribution of ETR under the influence of industry attributes.

In order to verify whether the ETR of Listed Companies in China is influenced by the company characteristics such as company size, asset structure and profitability, and the virtual variables such as year, industry, holding and tax preference. This paper uses OLS model to verify. OLS model is shown in (1):

$$ETR = \beta_{1} + \beta_{2}Control + \beta_{3}Control _rate + \beta_{4}Control * Control _rate + \beta_{5}Tax_rate + \beta_{6}FDC + \beta_{7}FW + \beta_{8}QTGY + \beta_{9}NY + \beta_{10}SHY + \beta_{11}SIZE + \beta_{12}LEV + \beta_{13}ROA + \beta_{14}CAPINT + \beta_{15}INVINT + \beta_{16}Year1 + \beta_{17}Year2 + \varepsilon$$

$$(1)$$

On the basis of static analysis, this paper applies CGE model to analyze the impact of adjusting the indirect tax rate on the real economy. In fact, it is to use a set of equations to describe the corresponding changes of output, price, demand and other factors during the change of indirect tax structure, the supply and demand sides in the market and the formation of various markets, and to analyze the effect of indirect tax structure adjustment.


3. Empirical Analysis


3.1 Descriptive Statistics of ETR

	Comprehensive	Industry	Energy	Service	commercial	real estate
Average	0.4731	0.4240	0.5006	0.4644	0.4808	0.5608
Median	0.4195	0.3813	0.4638	0.4667	0.4632	0.5742
Std.	0.2579	0.2711	0.2805	0.2490	0.2312	0.2470
Min	0.0349	0.0002	0.0139	0.0033	0.0053	0.0578
Max	0.9885	0.9943	0.9960	0.9443	0.9231	0.9993

Table 2: Description statistics of actual tax burden of Listed Companies in various industries

From table 2, it can be seen that the ETR of the real estate industry was the highest from 2008 to 2010, r eaching 0.5608, m ainly b ecause t he c ontinuous r ise of hous e prices in r ecent years has driven the rapid and high growth of the real estate industry, which has led to the increase of its ETR. T he E TR of t he energy i ndustry reached 0.5006, s econd only t o t hat of t he real e state industry. This is mainly due to the fact that most of the energy industry in China is monopolistic and there are a large number of monopoly profits, which makes its ETR relatively high. The actual tax bur den of C ommerce, c omprehensive i ndustry and s ervice i ndustry is 0.4808, 0.4731 a nd 0.4644 r espectively. T hese t hree i ndustries s how a high-speed growth t rend w ith t he r apid development of China's tertiary industry, so the ETR is high.Compared with other industries, the industrial ETR is at the lowest level, only 0.4240.








Figure 2: Comparison of ETR under different tax policies of various industries

It can be seen from Figure 1 t hat ETR is also different in different industries due to different

holding forms. The ETR of state-owned holding listed companies in Comprehensive industry[6] and industry[7] is slightly higher than that of non-state-owned holding listed companies. The actual tax burden of the state-owned holding listed companies in the comprehensive industry and industry is relatively high, which in dicates that the state controls the basic in dustries related to the people's livelihood. T he a ctual t ax bur den of non -state-owned holding listed c ompanies i n t he e nergy industry, s ervice i ndustry, commerce a nd r eal e state i ndustry is higher than t hat of s tate-owned holding listed companies.

It can be seen from Figure 2 that ETR varies among industries due to different tax preferential policies. Generally speaking, the ETR of listed companies enjoying preferential tax policies is lower than that of listed companies not enjoying preferential tax policies. In terms of specific industries, it is found that the ETR of listed companies enjoying preferential tax policies in industry and service industry is slightly higher, and other industries are a ffected by preferential tax policies, and their ETR is lower.

3.2 OLS regression analysis

e	
	Estimated coefficient
Intercept term	-0.3672***
Control	0.0487*
Control_rate	0.0968**
Control*Control_rate	-0.1475**
FDC	0.0700***
FW	0.0444**
ZH	0.0136
NY	0.0178
SHY	0.0893***
Tax rate	-0.0317***
SIZE	0.0406***
LEV	-0.4833***
CAPINT	-0.1689***
INVINT	0.3116***
ROA	2.5125***
Annual effect	control
Adjusted R2	0.4590
F value	70.4511***
Sample size	1311
	1011

Table 3: regression results

The regression results of OLS model are shown in Table 3. First, taking industry as the control group (FDC = 0, FW = 0, Zh = 0, NY = 0, SH = 0) and other industries as the comparison group, the results show that the estimated coefficients of real estate, service industry and C ommerce are significantly p ositive, in dicating that the E TR of the est h ree in dustries is h igher t han t hat of industry. T he estimated coefficients of e nergy i ndustry and c omprehensive i ndustry a re a lso positive, but not significant. This shows that the actual burden of income tax varies among different industries, and the ETR of real estate is significantly higher than that of industry.

Second, the estimation coefficient of state-owned holding (control) is significantly positive, indicating that the actual tax burden of state-owned holding listed companies is higher than that of non-state-owned holding listed companies. The estimated coefficient of control_rate is significantly

positive, i ndicating t hat t he hi gher t he control ratio, t he hi gher t he E TR of t he c ompany. T he estimation c oefficient o f c ontrol * c ontrol_rate o f s tate-owned holding i s s ignificantly ne gative, indicating that the higher the control ratio of state-owned holding, the lower the actual tax burden of the company. The regression results show that the actual tax burden of state-owned holding listed companies in comprehensive industries and industries is high, which indicates that the proportion of state-owned control rights is not high. The E TR of s tate-owned holding listed c ompanies in other industries is low, m ainly because t he proportion of c ontrol rights of s tate-owned holding listed companies in these industries is high.

Third, the estimated coefficient of tax_rate is significantly negative, indicating that the actual tax burden of listed companies enjoying tax preferential policies is lower than that of listed companies not enjoying tax preferential policies.

Fourth, a mong ot her explanatory variables, the estimated coefficient of the logarithm of total assets (size) is significantly positive, indicating that the actual tax burden of large-scale companies is h ighe. The estimated c oefficient of the e asset lia bility r atio (Lev) is s ignificantly negative, indicating that the tax credit effect of debt leads to the low ETR of listed companies with high asset liability ratio. The estimated coefficient of return on total assets (ROA) is significantly positive, indicating that the higher the profit level of listed companies, the higher the actual tax burden. The estimated coefficients of capital intensity (capint) and inventory intensity (invite) are significantly negative and significantly positive respectively, which indicates that the tax credit effect of as set depreciation reduces the actual tax burden of the company. The higher the inventory intensity, the lower the asset intensity. Therefore, the inventory intensity is positively related to the actual tax burden of the company.

Due to the changes in China's enterprise income tax system, the previous measurement analysis can only take three years of data, which makes the analysis conclusion a static result and cannot be used for prediction analysis. However, the purpose of analyzing the tax burden here is to provide reasonable suggestions for the overall adjustment of the tax. It is risky to predict the future situation only based on the static analysis. Therefore, this paper introduces a dynamic equilibrium model to analyze the impact of a djusting the indirect tax structure on C hina's macro-economy and w elfare when the proportion of direct tax and indirect tax is unchanged.

3.3 Based on CGE Model, the Influence of Industry Indirect Tax Adjustment on Social General Equilibrium Is Estimated

According to the above, a mong all industries, the real estate industry and the energy industry have the highest indirect tax actual tax burden, the industrial actual tax burden is the lowest, and the actual tax burden of other industries is not much different. As for the phenomenon of high indirect tax burden in the real estate industry and energy industry, one view holds that its high tax burden is caused by its high profits, and its tax burden is not high enough, and there is still the necessity and space for levying "windfall profits tax". A nother view is that these two industries, especially the energy industry, bear the responsibility of developing new energy, shoulder the heavy responsibility of e nergy price s tability and e nergy s ecurity in C hina, and c ompete with international e nergy companies. If the actual indirect tax burden is higher than the average level, it is likely to affect the impact of changes in the internal structure of indirect tax on the general social equilibrium, and such calculation is often realized by Using CGE model.

The C GE m odel c onstructed he re r efers t o ' a C GE m odel f or C hina pol icy a nalysis[8]' established b y D avid Roland H olst a nd D ominique va n de r m ensbrugghe (2009), and m ake corresponding adjustments according to the acquired data. This paper focuses on the overall impact

of the actual tax burden of enterprise income tax in different departments on the macro-economy, so it is necessary to classify different sectors of society. Consistent with the above, it is mainly divided into f ive pr oduction de partments, na mely, c ommerce, energy i ndustry, ot her i ndustries, s ervice industry, r eal e state i ndustry a nd c omprehensive de partments. T he w hole pr ocess i s c arried out according to the steps of parameter determination, inspection, calculation and result description, as follows.

Firstly, the process of model parameter determination and test. The CGE model is divided into five modules, namely, production module, income demand module, trade module, price module and closing module. Among them, the parameters of various price, elasticity and price, production and income demand modules need to be determined. The coefficient is set from the price module. Since almost all prices in the CGE model are relative prices, the initial value of some prices in the model is determined as 1 in advance. Then set the parameters of the production, income demand and trade modules. The share parameters of each department in the production function c an b e obtained through proportion accounting based on the data in the macro social accounting matrix. The share parameters and direct consumption coefficients in the income demand module function can be obtained through the initial data and parameters that have been set and calculated. A fter that, the remaining price is determined by closing the module and relevant optimization conditions. The elastic coefficient of the model is set in the test method first. Here, it is considered that Zhang Xin[9] Etc. are representative, and the elastic coefficient in the model is set ac cording to several elastic values given by them. The influence of the change of elastic value on the result is also tested. It is proved that the measurement result is stable with the change of elastic value, indicating that the reliability of elastic value is high and can be adopted.

Secondly, t he c alculation pr ocess of t he m odel. T aking t he out put of the i -th s ector as a n independent variable, the purpose is to find the general social equilibrium with the minimum total added value of all s ectors under t he c onstraints of a s eries of e quations and i nequalities. The restrictive conditions are:

Commodity equilibrium in the domestic market, that is, the supply of each commodity is equal to the demand of the commodity. In economic theory, the condition of social equilibrium is that the supply and demand of each commodity are equal and the market is cleared. However, in reality, this state is difficult to achieve, so there is an inventory item in the social accounting matrix. Here, the conditions for commodity equilibrium are changed according to the actual situation. If the supply of commodities fluctuates between 10% of the demand, the supply and demand of commodities are considered to be balanced, and the deviation is included in the current inventory.

The balance of supply and demand in the capital market and the labor market has been reached in the process of model setting.

The government is in balance. In the process of realizing this equilibrium, it is a ssumed that changes in the domestic e conomics ituation will not a ffect the government's income and expenditure from abroad and domestic debt income, and the proportion of government expenditure is fixed.

The e quilibrium be tween i nvestment a nd s avings has be en r eached in the process of m odel setting.

Balance of pa yments. In the classical e conomic theory, the condition for a country's general social e quilibrium is that the total amount of imports and exports is equal. However, China maintains a trade surplus for a long time, and forcibly applying this assumption will enlarge the error of the model. Therefore, in the process of initializing the model parameters, the proportion of China's total import and export volume is determined by setting the import and export parameters of different commodities. It is believed here that China maintains this proportion of total import and export volume, which is the condition for achieving balance of international payments.

Under this condition, this paper studies the impact of the internal proportion change of indirect tax on the general balance of society, so it is necessary to keep the proportion of indirect tax and direct tax unchanged. The specific approach is to adjust the nominal tax rate of the indirect tax of the two types of goods in the opposite proportion without changing the nominal tax rate of the direct tax, and then add the constraint condition that the ratio of the indirect tax and the direct tax is unchanged, so as to obtain the result of the general social equilibrium. However, there are problems in the actual operation, be cause changes in indirect taxes will lead to changes in the output of various de partments, a nd t hen l ead t o c hanges in di rect t axes t hrough a s eries of t ransmission mechanisms. And b ecause the direct tax and the indirect tax are equal, the indirect tax changes again, thus forming an infinite cycle, and it is impossible to find a specific general equilibrium solution. However, it can be found through equation solution that there is a limit to the final value of this cycle. Therefore, the process in the cycle is split here, and the semi-automatic simulation has similar effects. The method is to keep the tax revenue of indirect tax unchanged and find a group of general equilibrium solutions first. Then change the total income of indirect tax to the total direct tax, and then find a set of equilibrium solutions, and so on. The results show that the total change degree of direct tax and indirect tax can be less than 0.1% a fter repeated three times, and the proportion of direct tax and indirect tax can be approximately considered as unchanged.

Finally, the model calculation results and explanation. As mentioned above, the indirect tax rates of t he r eal e state i ndustry and t he energy industry are a djusted in t he positive a nd n egative directions respectively, and then the "other industry" is adjusted in the opposite direction. Among them, commerce and industry are s elected a s " another i ndustry", be cause t he c omprehensive industry includes agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and sideline fishery, and the actual tax rate is low, which is not suitable for adjustment. However, China's secondary industry accounts for a higher p roportion t han t he t ertiary i ndustry, s o choosing i ndustry and commerce as t he relative adjustment group can make the simulation starting point of the model closer to the final value and reduce the simulation steps. The reliability of the simulation can be improved.

Change rate of tax rate(%)	10	20	-10	-20
GDP(%)	0.153249	0.315947	-0.15576	-0.41375
Resident Welfare(%)	0.13977	0.288157	-0.3538	-0.60225
Enterprise income(%)	0.212238	0.437561	0.16352	-0.17019
Consumer demand(%)	0.13977	0.288157	-0.3538	-0.60225
Export level (%)	0.210167	0.433292	-0.67289	-1.05525
Investment demand (%)	0.236759	0.488115	-1.44124	-1.91445

Table 4: Increase and decrease of tax rate of real estate sector, and change of tax rate of commercial sector

It can be seen from the above table 4 that increasing the indirect tax rate of the real estate sector and r educing t he t ax r ate o f t he commercial s ector h ave a p ositive effect on G DP and o ther indicators. On the contrary, increasing the indirect tax rate of the commercial sector while reducing the t ax r ate o f t he r eal estate s ector h as a s ignificant n egative effect on t he ab ove e conomic indicators. When the change of the tax rate is around 20%, the inhibitory effect of the tax increase on the economic development of the commercial sector is greater than the promotion effect of the same degree of tax reduction. This shows that the real estate sector has a stronger ability to bear the tax b urden than the commercial s ector. A ccording to the ab ove an alysis, al though the a ctual t ax burden of i ndirect tax in C hina's r eal e state in dustry is h igh, and th e in direct tax r ate in the commercial sector is moderate, b alancing the two tax rates has a r estraining effect on the macro economy. In 2010, with the continuous rise of house prices and the rapid development of the real estate i ndustry, i f w e further i ncrease t he i ndirect t ax r ate o f t he r eal estate s ector and correspondingly reduce the indirect tax rate of the commercial sector, we believe that it can promote the development of the macro economy.

Change rate of tax rate(%)	10	20	-10	-20
GDP(%)	2.521601	6.102676	-1.34512	-0.71826
Resident Welfare(%)	2.299806	5.388455	-1.43344	-1.41542
Enterprise income(%)	3.492214	9.557456	-2.04309	-2.01503
Consumer demand(%)	2.299806	5.388455	-1.43344	-1.41542
Export level (%)	3.458141	7.220084	-2.16698	-2.0891
Investment demand(%)	3.895687	6.266632	-2.59023	-2.5659

 Table 5: Increase and decrease of tax rate of real estate sector, and change of tax rate of industrial sector

From the above table 5, we can see that the indirect tax rate of the real estate sector increases while t he t ax r ate of t he i ndustrial s ector de creases, which promotes t he de velopment of t he macro-economy, and t his effect i ncreases with t he i ncrease of t he d egree of ch ange. On t he contrary, it has a restraining effect on macroeconomic development, but all indicators show that this change h as not be come m ore obvious with t he further c hange of t ax r ate. D ifferent f rom t he commercial s ector, there are some s tate-owned c ompanies in the industrial s ector, which h ave a strong monopoly in the industry, so they have a strong ability to bear the tax burden. As a result, compared with commerce, industry has a stronger ability to bear indirect taxes.

Table 6: Increase and decrease of tax rate of Energy sector, and change of tax rate of commercial sector

Change rate of tax rate(%)	10	20	-10	-20
GDP(%)	-0.14593	-0.30085	0.065526	0.02764
Resident Welfare(%)	-0.13309	-0.27439	-0.14068	-0.17717
Enterprise income(%)	-0.2021	-0.41666	0.449764	0.400757
Consumer demand(%)	-0.13309	-0.27439	-0.14068	-0.17717
Export level (%)	-0.20013	-0.41259	-0.34492	-0.40107
Investment demand(%)	-0.22545	-0.4648	-1.03533	-1.10483

Table 7: Increase and decrease of tax rate of Energy sector, and change of tax rate of industrial sector

Change rate of tax rate(%)	10	20	-10	-20
GDP(%)	2.208921	3.444951	-1.42358	-0.87594
Resident Welfare(%)	2.014628	3.14194	-1.4357	-1.41995
Enterprise income(%)	3.059177	4.770979	-2.0466	-2.02209
Consumer demand(%)	2.014628	3.14194	-1.4357	-1.41995
Export level (%)	3.029329	4.724429	-2.17673	-2.10869
Investment demand(%)	3.412619	5.322195	-2.59328	-2.57202

It can be seen from the above table 6 that, on the premise of maintaining the stability of the total indirect tax revenue, the positive and negative adjustment of the tax rates of the energy sector and the commercial sector has a restraining effect on the macroeconomic development. This shows that the two departments have similar characteristics, that is, the reduction of tax burden has limited stimulation to them, while the increase of tax burden is relatively obvious. This shows that the indirect tax burden between the two departments was designed reasonably in 2010, and the tax rate of one of the departments was relatively reduced or increased, which did not significantly promote the macro-economy, indicating that the tax rate at this time reached a relatively optimal value.

Similar to the e conomic facts d escribed in T able 7, the indirect tax rate in the energy s ector increases while the tax rate in the industrial sector decreases, which promotes the development of the macro-economy, and this effect increases with the increase of tax rate change. On the contrary, it has a restraining effect on macroeconomic development, and this effect does not increase with the increase of tax rate change. However, different from the real estate sector, raising the tax rate of the energy sector and lowering the tax rate of the industrial sector have little effect on the economy, indicating that the energy sector has a lower ability to bear the indirect tax burden than the real estate sector.

Based on these four tables, we can rank the degree of reflection of the four departments on indirect tax changes, as shown in the following table 8:

	Affordability to increase tax burden	Promotion of tax burden reduction on industry development
Very Strong	Real estate industry	Industry
Strong	Energy industry	Energy industry
Weak	Industry	Commercial
Very weak	Commercial	Real estate industry

Table 8: Sensitivity matrix of four departments to indirect taxes

Compared with the real estate industry and the energy industry, although both are industries with high m onopoly and high profits, their ability to be art he indirect tax burden is very different. Because C hina's state-owned e nergy enterprises be art her esponsibility of stabilizing national energy security, and at the same time, they also have the mission of developing new energy. They also have to face the competition from domestic and foreign competitors in the same industry. In fact, the development pressure is great, and even the state subsidies are required. However, with the rise of house prices, the real estate industry did achieve a high profit in 2010. Therefore, the tax bearing capacity of the two is different. This should be noted when adjusting the indirect tax rate. Because the profits of small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises in China are very thin and the pressure for survival is very great, the promotion effect of indirect tax rate reduction on industry is very obvious. Based on the above analysis, it is suggested that the tax rate of the real estate sector should be a ppropriately i ncreased and the tax r ate of the i ndustrial s ector should be r educed according t o the e conomic s ituation i n 2010, which c an pl ay a positive r ole i n pr omoting t he macro-economy.

4. Conclusions

According to the existing theories and the above analysis, the conclusion of the empirical study is: From 2008 to 2010, there were significant differences in the actual burden of income tax among different i ndustries in C hina. F rom the perspective of holding f orm and proportion, the E TR of state-owned c omprehensive industry and industrial listed companies is slightly higher than that of non-state-owned l isted companies. T he a ctual t ax bur den of non -state-owned holding l isted companies in the energy industry, service industry, commerce and real estate industry is higher than that of s tate-owned holding l isted companies. From the perspective of i ncome t ax pr eferential policies, e xcept th at the E TR of listed c ompanies e njoying the p referential tax p olicies in the industrial and service industries is slightly higher, other industries are affected by the preferential tax policies, and their ETR is lower.

In recent years, the continuous rise of house prices has driven the rapid and high growth of the real estate industry, making the E TR of the real estate industry significantly higher than that of other industries. E TR of energy industry with monopolistic characteristics is second only to real

estate i ndustry. W ith the r apid d evelopment of the t ertiary i ndustry, c ommerce, comprehensive industry and service industry show a high-speed growth trend, so the ETR is also high. Compared with other industries, industry is at the lowest level.

However, although the real estate sector has the heaviest actual tax burden, its ability to bear the tax burden is also the strongest. And reducing the tax burden has the most obvious promotion effect on industry, even though the actual tax burden is the lightest. Therefore, on the premise that the proportion of direct and indirect taxes remains unchanged, the indirect tax rate of the real estate industry c an be increased and the indirect tax rate of the industrial sector can be reduced. It is believed that it can help promote the economic development and improve the social welfare level of China.

In addition, the analysis also found that the total assets representing the size of the company and the return on total assets representing the profitability were significantly positively correlated with ETR, indicating that the larger the size of the company, the stronger the profitability, and the higher the actual tax burden of the listed company. The asset liability ratio and asset concentration, which represent the asset structure, are significantly negatively correlated with ETR, mainly due to the tax offset effect of debt and asset depreciation. There are still shortcomings in this paper:

The actual control nature of municipal companies is only divided into state-owned holding and non-state-owned holding, without considering the state-owned enterprises controlled by the local government in the state-owned holding, which will cau sets ome companies that are actually state-owned enterprises not to be classified as state-owned holding companies.

When d etermining whether l isted companies e njoy t ax p reference, o nly t ax p reference i s considered, and the diversification of t ax pr eference f orms i s i gnored. T his will cau se a s mall number of C ompanies in the sample to actually enjoy the subjective tax preference and tax base preference of the local government and not be classified as tax preference companies.

The above shortcomings may have a certain impact on t he conclusions of this paper, which needs further empirical verification.

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